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CIVIL PROCEDURE-SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER NONRESIDENT MOTORIST 
STATUTE-EFFECT OF DEATH OF NoNRESIDENT DEFENDANT-A wife sued for 
the wrongful death of her husband, which was allegedly caused by a non-
resident defendant's negligent operation of his automobile on a Wisconsin 
highway while the plaintiff's husband was a passenger therein. Service of 
process was made on the Commissioner of the Motor Vehicle Department in 
Wisconsin, and copies of the summons and complaint were mailed to defendant 
in Illinois in accordance with the Wisconsin nonresident motorist statute.1 
Shortly thereafter, before a judgment was rendered, defendant died. Plaintiff 
sought to revive the action against defendant's administrator by serving notice 
of the filing of a petition for revival on the Commissioner of the Motor Vehicle 
Department in Wisconsin and by serving upon the nonresident administrator 
by registered mail a copy of the petition. On special appearance by the 
administrator the circuit court ordered the petition for revival and the notice 
set aside and vacated. On appeal, held, reversed. By virtue of the nonresident 
motorist statute a user of the highway makes an irrevocable appointment of a 
state official as his agent for the purpose of receiving process. The appointment 
is binding on the nonresident's administrator, and an action pending against 
the decedent at the time of his death may be revived against the administrator. 
Tarczynski v. Chicago, Milwaukee;. St. Paul & Pacipc R. R., 261 Wis. 149, 52 
N. W. (2d) 396 (1952). 
Encouraged by Kane v. New Jersey2 and Hess v. Pawloski,3 all forty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia now have nonresident motorist statutes by 
which a state through substituted service may obtain jurisdiction over persons 
who commit liability-creating acts while driving upon the highways of the 
forum state.4 In their initial form, however, the statutes made no specific 
provision for obtaining jurisdiction over the personal representative5 of the 
motorist, so that if the wrongdoer died prior to or pending suit, substituted 
service was not available.6 Several legislatures have amended their statutes to 
120 Colo. 454, 210 P. (2d) 985 (1949). As to the possibility of splitting a cause of action 
in re a declaratory judgment proceeding compare New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 
131 Conn. 456, 40 A. (2d) 763 (1944), and Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. City of 
Bellevue, 284 Ky. 405, 144 S.W. (2d) 1046 (1940). 
1 Wis. Stat. (1951) §85.05(3). 
2 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30 (1916), upholding a New Jersey statute which provided 
that a nonresident could not use the state's highways unless he first executed a written 
instrument designating the secretary of state as attorney for the service of process. 
3 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927). The statute involved did not require the motor-
ist's actual consent for the appointment. 
4 For a compilation of all the nonresident motorist statutes as of 1947, see Knoop v. 
Anderson, (D.C. Iowa 1947) 71 F. Supp. 832. 
5 In this note "personal representative" is used to include executor and administrator, 
unless othenvise indicated. 
6 Courts uniformly held that in absence of a specific provision the personal representa-
tive of a deceased motorist was not reached by substituted service. Usually this result was 
by construction of the statute. Downing v. Schwenck, 138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278 
(1940); Donnelly v. Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463, 9 N.E. (2d) 888 (1936); Ledin v. 
Davison, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934). Some relied in part upon revocation of 
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provide that a motorist's appointment of a public official as his agent for 
purposes of service is to be binding on the motorist's personal representative in 
any proceeding against the motorist or the personal representative growing out 
of the former's use of the highway.7 Since any judgment recovered in the forum 
will have to be enforced,. if at all, in the state of the decedent's domicile, the 
validity of these amendments will probably be raised by the issue of con-
stitutional full faith and credit, which involves the question of the forum's 
jurisdiction. Thus far the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the 
matter. Four other courts, however, had considered the problem prior to the 
principal case.8 Two arguments against the validity of these amended statutes 
have generally been advanced: (I) Since the statutes are framed in terms of 
agency between the nonresident motorist and the public officer, the agency is 
terminated by the death of the motorist; and (2) although jurisdiction can be 
acquired over the motorist himself in an in personam action under Hess 11. 
Pawloski, an action against the personal representative is an action in rem, and 
since the decedent's property is outside the forum, no jurisdiction is acquired over 
the res by substituted service on the personal representative. The usual answer 
to the first argument has been that the appointment of the agent is an act of 
the forum's police power, and the police power is not limited by common law 
rules of agency and contract.9 That the agency is not revoked by death would 
seem to be clear, inasmuch as Hess 11. Pawloski is grounded upon the idea that 
the appointment is in truth made by the state, not by the motorist.1° Further-
more, the real basis of jurisdiction over the motorist is not the agency of the 
public officer, but rather the doing of a liability-creating act by the motorist 
and the giving of notice to him.11 Furthermore, as long as it is constitutional 
for the state to make the appointment while the motorist lives, no reason is 
perceived why the appointment may not in accordance with due process be 
made to continue after the death of the motorist. But whether the statute 
ought to be permitted to confer jurisdiction over the personal representative is 
the agency of the public officer by death of The motorist. Young v. Potter Title & Trust 
Co., 114 N.J.L. 561, 178 A. 177 (1935); Donnelly v. Carpenter, supra this note. 
7 Note l supra. 
8 The cases holding that these provisions give the forum jurisdiction over the personal 
representative are Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. (2d) 876 (1950); Plopa v. 
Du Pre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W. (2d) 777 (1950); and Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 
792, 171 S.W. (2d) 287 (1943). Contra: Knoop v. Anderson, note 4 supra. Although the 
principal case is the first to raise the issue on revivor, it would seem to be subject to the 
same analysis as cases based on an action brought against the personal representative in 
the first instance. McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925); Heath v. 
Santa Lucia Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 3 F. (2d) 326; Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 6 A. 
(2d) 499 (1939). 
9 Plopa v. Du Pre, note 8 supra, Oviatt v. Garretson, note 8 supra, Leighton v. Roper, 
note 8 supra, stated that the agency was created for the benefit of third persons and the 
state, and so was not revoked by death. 
10 This appears to be the primary distinction between the statute involved in Kane v. 
New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30 (1916), and the one involved in Hess v. Pawloski, 
274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927). See notes 2 and 3 supra. 
11 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259 (1928). 
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another question. As to the second argument, it would seem that no valid 
ground has been advanced for considering this action an in rem proceeding. 
No right to possession or title to specific property is being asserted or adjudicated. 
Only a judgment that can be asserted against the decedent's personal repre-
sentative in a subsequent probate proceeding is being sought.12 In any event 
it is clear that the personal representative must be before the court in his 
official capacity in order to have a judgment that is enforceable in the state of 
domicile. The issue, then, is whether such jurisdiction can be obtained by 
substituted service.13 
Traditionally it has been the rule that a personal representative cannot be 
sued in a state other than the one appointing him,14 even though he makes a 
general appearance,15 nor can an action pending at the decedent's death be 
revived against the personal representative.16 It is said· that this is so because 
in the contemplation of the law the personal representative exists in his official 
capacity only because of the act of appointment by the state of the decedent's 
domicile.17 Since the appointing state has given him all his powers and has 
not consented to his being recognized elsewhere, he cannot cross the boundary 
of that state in his official capacity.18 Thus, the forum in reaching out to grasp 
the personal representative cannot lay hold upon him in his official capacity,19 
which is necessary for reaching the estate, the real purpose of the action. 
Furthermore, it is said that the personal representative by accepting his office 
has agreed to be subject only to the laws of the place that has control of the 
decedent's estate. For an outside sovereign to impinge upon his duties would 
be to require him to pay the debts of another man against his will.20 A state's 
12Leighton v. Roper, note 8 supra. See also Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 66 
S.Ct. 296 (1946). This fact is sometimes used to support the argument that no interference 
with the administration of estates would result from permitting the forum to acquire juris-
diction. 61 HARV, L. REv. 355 (1948); Scott, "Hess and Pawloski Carry On," 64 HARv. 
L. REv. 98 (1950). 
13 The argument favoring the obtention of jurisdiction is necessarily dependent upon 
the police power for several reasons: Hess v. Pawloski appears to rest upon the forum's 
police power; any fiction that consent of the decedent binds the personal representative is 
exploded by Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 210 U.S. 82, 28 S.Ct. 702 (1908); and consent 
of the personal representative would not be sufficient, note 15 infra. 
141 WoERNER, AMERICAN I.Aw oF .ADMJ:NISTRATION §160 (1923); CoNFLICT OF 
LAws RESTATEMENT §512 (1934); citations in 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., 1552, 
n. 3 (1935). 
15 CONFLICT oF LAws RESTATEMENT §513 (1935); Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436, 
22 S. 44 (1897); First Nat. Bank v. Pancake, 172 N.C. 513, 90 S.E. 515 (1916). Contra: 
Evans v. Tatem, 9 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 252 (1823). 
16 McMaster v. Gould, note 8 supra; Nat. Bank of Topeka v. Mitchell, 154 Kan. 276, 
118 P. (2d) 519 (1941). 
17 CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT §512, comment a (1948 Supp.); Goodrich, 
"Conllict of Laws Since the Restatement," 23 A.B.A.J. 119 (1937); 21 CoRN. L.Q. 458 
(1936). 
18 In re Cowham's Estate, 220 Mich. 560, 190 N.W. 680 (1922); Nash v. Benari, 
117 Me. 491, 105 A. 107 (1918). 
19 Nor would he be reached in his personal capacity, inasmuch as he has no basic 
relationship with the forum upon which to base jurisdiction. 
20 3 BEALE, CONFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., 1553 (1935). 
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police power seems unable to exist to this extent without overturning many 
established rules of the administration of estates and diminishing any concept 
of the sovereignty of states. Although a state may reach the motorist himself 
because of his liability-creating act, it has never been considered that a personal 
representative "steps into the shoes" of the decedent. The personal repre-
sentative acquires no rights or duties from the decedent; all come from the 
appointment by the domiciliary state. He is in the nature of a trustee, taking 
nothing in his own right.21 Being separate from the deceased, he has no basic 
relationship with the forum upon which the forum can base jurisdiction. Even 
the police power of a state should not be able to create a basic relationship 
where none in fact exists. If the concept of sovereignty has any meaning, it 
must mean this much: A state has the power to limit the duties and rights 
of its own legal creations, and no other state can impose liabilities upon that 
creature when no connection between the latter state and the creature has 
ever existed, unless the creating state consents to the impositions. These con-
siderations would seem to outweigh the arguments that fairness and expediency 
ought to permit an injured person to sue where the accident occurred.22 It is 
submitted that the principal case reached an improper result. 
Warren K. Urbom, S.Ed. 
21 This is a relatively modern concept. In the older law the executor, if not the admin-
istrator, took full title to the property and could thus be sued anywhere. Holmes, ''Execu-
tors," 9 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1895); Judge Pound in McMaster v. Gould, note 8 supra. 
22 This is not to suggest that it is undesirable to have the suit tried where the accident 
occurs. But the result ought to be achieved through reciprocal statutes or similar devices 
whereby the state of domicile consents to having the personal representatives appointed by 
it sued elsewhere. 
